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I
INTRODUCTION

After all our efforts and all Keck's money, where are we? Some good has
been accomplished. By committing its resources to the study of legal ethics, the
W.M. Keck Foundation has encouraged law schools to pay attention to a subject
all too often ignored. That itself is good. The money has made things happen.
Schools have held conferences devoted to legal ethics that otherwise would not
have been held;1 schools have experimented with teaching programs in legal
ethics that otherwise might have been left untried;' members of the practicing
bar have had conversations and debates with academics about the responsibilities of lawyers that otherwise might not have occurred; and a few scholars have
written papers examining the responsibilities of lawyers that otherwise might not
have been written.3 All that is good.
But the picture is not all rosy. Legal ethics remains the step-child of legal
education. Serious scholarship in legal ethics is still considered somewhat of an
oxymoron.4 Most faculties remain unconvinced that the subject can be taught
or even that there is a subject here worth teaching.' And at most schools the
"pervasive method," in which legal ethics is integrated into the standard
coursework, is still little more than tokenism designed to satisfy the American

Copyright © 1996 by Law and Contemporary Problems
* Professor of Law, Boston University.
** Trustee Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania.
1. E.g., Mass Tortes: Serving Up Just Desserts (Victims-Lawyers-Class Actions-Mass Torts),
Cornell Law School (Oct. 23-24, 1994); Colloquium On the Future Of the Legal Profession, Harvard
Law School (Mar. 22, 1995); this conference, Symposium On Teaching Ethics and the Legal Profession,
Duke University School of Law (Nov. 2-3, 1995); and the W.M. Keck Foundation Forum On the
Teaching of Legal Ethics, William and Mary School of Law (Mar. 22-23, 1996).
2. E.g., The University of Michigan Law School has enriched its Ethics Bridge Week program in
ethics, while Cornell Law School and Boston University Law School use the pervasive materials we
have developed.
3. E.g., Symposium, Mass Tortes: Serving Up Just Desserts, 80 Cornell L. Rev. 811 (1995);
Symposium, Forum On the Teaching of Legal Ethics, 38 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. (forthcoming 1996).
4. Many first-tier law schools have no faculty member or no senior faculty member whose research
centers on questions of legal ethics. In our conversations with members of those faculties, a persistent
refrain is that most of the scholarship in this subject is seen by faculty members as below the school's
standards.
5. A number of schools have abandoned their basic ethics course because student reaction to those
courses is so negative, and faculty members doubt that the subject is worth teaching. Others profess
to believe the subject is worth teaching but insist that only the rarest of individuals can make the course
work.
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Bar Association ("ABA") accreditation requirement.6 To some extent, the
symposium at which this essay was presented masks those problems. There we
assembled a rare group: scholars that have managed to be taken seriously while
taking legal ethics seriously.
An impressive collection of law school deans was also present, but there are
reasons to believe that law school deans see legal ethics differently than the
average faculty member. First, deans have much more contact with the
practicing bar than most faculty members, and, in our experience, practicing
lawyers are much more likely to preach the importance of professional
responsibility than academics. Second, deans have direct responsibility for
getting their schools through the accreditation process, which means getting as
clean an ABA report as possible. This makes deans more active advocates for
some plausible coverage of legal ethics than other faculty members. Third,
deans must take direct responsibility for fixing courses that students may
complain about, such as legal ethics. Fourth, deans are responsible for raising
money. If a donor or potential donor treats legal ethics seriously, as the Keck
Foundation has done, it is likely that most law school deans will treat it
seriously as well, particularly when they hear similar concerns from practicing
lawyers, the ABA, and students.
We believe the lowly status of legal ethics within the larger law school
community is the biggest challenge facing both those who teach basic or
advanced courses in this subject and those who seek to "mainstream" matters
of professional responsibility. At the time we applied for a Keck grant, we had
already published a book for the basic ethics course.7 The course embodied in
that book represented our best effort to reform attitudes about the subject. We
believe the course we designed is both pedagogically challenging and that it
works, but we also believe that reaching students in one class is not enough.
We thus applied for a grant dedicated to improving the materials used to teach
ethics through the pervasive method.
The pervasive method exists as an actuality at all schools. Legal ethics
cannot be segregated from the rest of the law school curriculum. Whenever a
professor asks a student what the lawyer in a case should have done differently,
what strategy might have worked better than the one employed, what advice a
lawyer should give a client in light of certain legal principles, students are being
asked what a lawyer might do and what a lawyer should do. Ethics, in other
words, is being taught throughout the law school curriculum, whether or not
faculty members are aware of it. Indeed, we believe that students garner their

6. Many faculty members resent having to teach ethics, a subject with which they have little
familiarity, and do so only to placate the administration. Others refuse to comply with administration
pleas to include an ethics component, insisting that this requirement only takes away precious time that
should be devoted to "coverage" of their subject matter.
7. GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & SUSAN P. KONIAK, THE LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING
(1990). A second edition of this book, with the co-authorship of Professor Roger C. Cramton has since
been published. THE LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING (2d ed. 1994).
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basic understanding of a lawyer's proper role not in ethics courses, but in other
law school courses, which are teaching implicitly, if not explicitly, what a lawyer
does and should do. The number of hours spent learning explicit lessons of
professional responsibility in any school's basic ethics course is dwarfed by the
sheer number of hours spent learning lawyering-lessons in those other courses.
Thus, all schools in fact use the pervasive method of teaching legal ethics.
Unfortunately, much of what is taught is done so without reflection. Slipshod, ill-informed teaching is generally condemned in law school. Yet that fact
only demonstrates how little respect the subject of legal ethics commands, for
when it comes to discussing what a lawyer should do, shoddy "anything-goes"
instruction is commonplace and accepted. Many professors fail to recognize
matters of professional responsibility when they come up, and thus end up
communicating an answer to an ethics question without knowing they have done
SO.
For example, in most contracts courses and many courses in commercial law,
professors cover unconscionability and contracts of adhesion. In covering these
topics, cases such as Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute,' are discussed. In Carnival
the Supreme Court held that a forum-selection clause printed on the back of a
cruise ticket in small print was enforceable, although a long line of precedent
disfavored the enforcement of provisions that limit where an individual could
bring suit. The case makes no mention of lawyer ethics. It is almost always
taught without any mention of the ethics of the lawyers who drafted the
provision and who should have known, assuming they were competent, that the
provision was of very doubtful validity at the time it was drafted. By teaching
cases like Carnivalwithout mention of ethics, a lesson is being conveyed that
the cruise line lawyers won their gamble because the court upheld the provision.
The implicit lesson is that it is good lawyering on behalf of a corporate client
to push the envelope on clauses in consumer contracts. After all, most
consumers are likely to assume that legal language is valid (whether it is or not).
And, even if a consumer challenges the language, a court may write new law
and accept that a previously disfavored or invalid clause is now acceptable.
The problem with these implicit lessons is that they leave out many
important considerations. For example, in Carnival the Court held the clause
valid on the assumption that the consumers had appropriate notice of the clause.
But, as later litigation in the state courts showed, the company sold its tickets
on a non-refundable basis, and the consumers were often asked to pay for the
tickets without any notice that these tickets would limit where they could file
suit.9 That selling practice would make the clause unenforceable once again,
the Supreme Court opinion notwithstanding.1 0 Did the lawyers know how the
tickets were sold? Should they have known? Inasmuch as notice is essential to

8. 499 U.S. 585 (1991).
9. Carnival Cruise Lines v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 286 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1991).
10. Id.
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the enforceability of questionable contract terms, does a lawyer have an
obligation to advise the client that appropriate notice of the terms must be
given? By teaching unconscionability doctrine as if the lawyers who draft
contract terms are not part of the transaction, one communicates implicit
messages about a lawyer's role. It suggests, for example, that concerns about
enforcement are matters between the company and the consumer, not matters

that implicate the company's lawyer. 1
Of course, some teachers employ a more deliberate approach to teaching
legal ethics "pervasively." But, in our opinion, those efforts are often as flawed
as the unconscious method of proceeding. For example, many teachers
consciously include some discussion of ethics in their substantive courses only
because they are coerced by their institutions to do so. They thus include ethics
material, but manage at the same time to communicate their disdain for the
subject in some manner, often by joking about the concept of an ethical lawyer.
Those who take the enterprise more seriously nonetheless often manage to
communicate the unimportance of the subject by honestly professing how little
they know about what they are supposed to be teaching. In even the bestintentioned professor's hands, the pervasive approach generally ends up
producing the following effect on students: at some point in the study of
contracts, torts, criminal law, or property, serious study is perceived by students
as having been temporarily suspended; analysis of text ceases; books close; pens
are placed on desktops; and aimless discussion begins. Students may pay little
attention to what is explicit in the discussion, but a strong implicit message is
conveyed: Professional responsibility is nonsense, unworthy of serious reflection
or study, a matter of personal taste, a seat-of-the-pants enterprise.
With this bleak picture of how the pervasive method actually works in most
schools, we set out to improve the situation by producing materials that would
help convince professors there was something worth teaching-something they
could teach without feeling that the enterprise was a joke, or irrelevant, or that
they were incompetent to teach it. We set out to produce materials that would
help law students learn something about their responsibilities as lawyers and
that would encourage a serious approach toward those responsibilities and the
complexity of being an ethical person in an unredeemed and often unforgiving
world.
Our aim was not to displace the basic ethics course with the pervasive

method. We do not believe that legal ethics should be taught solely through the
pervasive method. The subject is complex enough to merit the prolonged and
concentrated attention that can be provided only through a course devoted to
the topic. Moreover, the pervasive method deals poorly with topics in legal
ethics that require expertise and sustained treatment in their own right, such as

11. In the pervasive materials we have developed for contracts courses, we have included Carnival
along with extensive teaching notes on the ethical issues raised by this case and similar cases on
unconscionability doctrine and consumer contracts.
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conflicts of interest and confidentiality. Finally, we believe that the pervasive
method, if employed alone, too often leaves students with a scatter-shot,
shallow, and unintegrated understanding of the subject and their responsibilities.
However, we also believe that the pervasive method cannot be avoided, that
teachers have a responsibility to consider what lessons about lawyering they are
conveying, and that it is no easy task to teach something that the community
does not take seriously. Thus, we thought it worthwhile to concentrate on
improving the materials available to teach legal ethics through the pervasive
method.
II
OUR APPROACH TO AND MATERIALS FOR THE PERVASIVE METHOD

We designed ethics materials and wrote extensive teaching notes to assist
professors in using those materials effectively for courses in contracts, torts,
property, civil procedure, and criminal law. We also have materials available
for courses in corporate law and intellectual property, but we do not have
written teaching notes available for those subjects. 2 We encourage readers of
this essay who teach in any of those areas to contact us for copies of these
materials.
The process we used to develop the materials was essentially the same for
each course. We started by identifying "good cases," not hypotheticals, not
problems or law review articles or non-legal materials, but cases. We will come
back in a moment to what makes something a "good" case, but first a word
about our choice to use cases as opposed to other sources. Cases are familiar
to both students and teachers. Teachers in all subject areas know how to teach
cases, and students know how to read them. More important, in the law school
culture, cases signal that something important is going on. When cases are the
focus, students know that law is being taught, that they should pay attention.
It is a mistake to think the same attention and air of seriousness attends the use
of less traditional teaching materials.13
Like all robust institutions, law schools have their own culture. And like all
cultures, the law school culture provides signs with which those within the
culture communicate with one another-signs that are used to infuse events with
meaning and inspire people toward culturally approved goals. 4 In law school
culture, despite reform efforts, the study of case law, the use of the Socratic (or
modified Socratic) method, the essay exam, and rigorous analytic thought are

12. However, we would be happy to help any professors in those areas who are interested in using
our materials, and perhaps through that cooperative effort we could produce some notes to accompany
those materials.
13. See Ronald Pipkin, Law School Instruction in ProfessionalResponsibility:A CurricularParadox,
1979 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 247.
14. Cultural signs, precisely because they are powerful tools of communication, are subject to
reinterpretation by minority groups within the system. Thus, the important signs within any culture
bear more than one meaning and often stand for contradictory propositions.
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still important means of signifying that an area of study is serious.15 On the
other hand, the showing of videotapes, open-ended class discussion, the reading
of non-legal sources, particularly if those sources are fictional works, are often
signs that a subject is not serious.16 Regrettable as this state of affairs may be,
as we survey American legal education at the end of the twentieth century, we
believe the dominant culture remains Socratic/analytic/case-centered. This is not
to say that we believe cases are the best or only way of learning law, but it is
to say that the case method is still dominant in law schools and is still associated
with the more rigorous and serious areas of law.
We would not, however, have chosen to use cases for their aura alone. We
also believe that they are a good way of investigating questions of professional
responsibility because cases are a suitable vehicle for teaching law, and we
believe the ethical problems confronting lawyers cannot be extricated from the
law. First, the problems arise in the practice of some specific area of law (for
example, securities law or divorce litigation). The specific "background" law,
the substantive area in which the problem is embedded, itself often creates the
dilemma, and it may also provide a way out of it. Second, the background law
or the law governing lawyers (agency law, criminal law, civil procedure, evidence
law, and the ethics rules) may prescribe paths upon which lawyers are supposed
to travel when facing such dilemmas and may proscribe other paths. In sum,
law may allow, require, or prohibit a particular course of conduct. The law not
only seeks to limit and empower the client, it seeks to limit and empower the
lawyer.
Neither of us would suggest that blind obedience to law is the equivalent of
ethical conduct or is a moral stance worthy of adoption. We believe that
lawyers, in particular because their role demands respect for law, should choose
a course of conduct only after considering what the law has to say about lawyers
choosing that course. In some situations, the right thing to do may be to
disobey the law. That route is, however, always risky for the lawyer and usually
for the client. More important, the law's prohibition might reflect concerns that
the lawyer has overlooked in assessing what is right to do. We believe that
lawyers should consider in the most serious way what the law commands and
the reasons for those commands before deciding on an extra-legal or illegal
course of conduct. But that means lawyers must know the law, which means
there is a point to teaching it as part of ethics.
Cases are, however, not simply adequate vehicles for teaching law; they are
"war stories," recounting difficult situations that lawyers have actually
confronted. They thus can bring an immediacy to questions of professional
responsibility that may not be as easy to convey through hypotheticals,
"problems," law review articles, or philosophical theories. Although some
videotape material and some books and articles can convey more immediacy

15. See Pipkin, supra note 13.
16. Id.
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than even the most detailed appellate case, those materials have significant
"negatives" attached to them. We avoid recommending reliance on them,
particularly in courses dedicated to some area of study that does not regularly
make use of such materials.
The biggest negative is one we have already mentioned: Students do not
associate these non-case materials with serious study. Are non-traditional
materials thus forever to be banned from the law school class? No. But, if law
school education is to broaden its methods of teaching by using non-traditional
materials, that agenda must begin with courses that are at the center of legal
education, whose weightiness is beyond dispute within the law school
culture-Corporate Law, Constitutional Law, Civil Procedure, to name just a
few. The reputation of legal ethics is too weak to be a suitable vehicle to lead
any credible reform movement. The likely result of such an effort will be to
discredit ethics and non-traditional materials at the same time. There is another
important negative as well: The use of non-traditional materials to teach legal
ethics serves to perpetuate the disconnect between "law" and legal ethics. Legal
ethics cannot be separated from law. The ethics rules that govern lawyers are
law in every state. To continue to suggest otherwise-to continue to suggest
that legal ethics is somehow a matter of personal taste or honor-is to deny a
critical premise of the legal system that regulates the practice of law. Denying
this premise leads budding lawyers astray. It also suggests that, at least for
lawyers, conforming one's conduct to the requirements of law is a simple
proposition unworthy of sustained study or a goal so devoid of dignity that it is
unworthy of sustained discussion. We reject both those propositions and will
return to them later.
In choosing cases to include in our materials, we insisted on two qualities.
The case had to raise important questions of professional responsibility, while
raising some question in the host-subject of law that professors in that area
normally cover, or at least, would consider worth covering. We were trying to
find cases that would allow a contracts professor, for example, to integrate the
teaching of contracts with the teaching of professional responsibility. Ideally,
we were hoping that the teacher would come to see how considering the ethical
questions raised by the case would add to the discussion of the host-area of law.
For example, most, if not all, tort classes cover cases in which courts have
relaxed the doctrine of privity, thereby allowing those not in privity of contract
to sue the manufacturer of a product. Our tort materials include a case in
which Judge Posner analyzes why the doctrine of privity protected lawyers from
suit by third-parties long after manufacturers of goods lost that protection. 7
That case provides an excellent vehicle for studying the tort doctrine, the
application of economic analysis to tort law, and the responsibilities of lawyers
to third parties harmed by efforts made by lawyers on behalf of their clients.
It raises in its own way the classic problem of how far a lawyer should go in

17. Greycas v. Proud, 826 F.2d 1560 (7th Cir. 1987).
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zealously advocating her client's cause, but it is also a case that fits naturally
into the torts course.
Our criminal law materials include a case in which a lawyer was prosecuted
and convicted of obstruction of justice. 8 It includes a careful discussion of
how otherwise lawful acts may constitute the actus reus of a crime when
combined with a culpable mental state. Here the lawful acts that constituted the
actus reus were typical lawyering activities, such as advising the client to take
the fifth amendment, which the lawyer allegedly did with the corrupt intent of
helping third parties to avoid apprehension by the police. Should certain acts,
like advising clients of their rights, be excluded from the purview of criminal
prohibition no matter the intent of the actor? The court examines that
question, providing the criminal law professor with a rich opportunity to discuss
the actus reus/mens rea requirements of criminal law and the lawyer's special
role in our constitutional system.
Our contracts cases include one in which the issue is essentially whether a
contract, or only an agreement to try to make a contract, has been made. 9
The alleged contract is, however, a contract to settle a case. The facts suggest
that the client communicated its intent to be bound by the settlement to its
lawyer, who passed that intention on to the court and the opposing party;
however, before the deal was finally signed, the client changed its mind (and its
management). The lawyer resigned. This case raises important contract
questions, and many important questions about lawyer-client communication,
lawyer-court communication, and the significance lawyers should ascribe to the
words of an opposing lawyer. The intellectual property cases include a
challenge to the ethics rule prohibiting criminal defense lawyers from
contracting with the defendant for the literary or movie rights to the client's
story.2" We were able to find cases in each area of law we tackled that
provided similar opportunities for integrating ethics issues and issues in the hostsubject.
To overcome the host-professor's unfamiliarity with the ethical questions, we
committed ourselves to writing detailed teaching notes on those questions. We
did not, however, sit down to write those notes until we had a chance to discuss
our case selections with professors in the host area and practitioners as well.
We wanted our teaching notes to reflect the perspective of those teaching in the
host field. We also wanted our notes to reflect the perspective of practitioners
of law and, whenever possible, the client's perspective on the problem at hand.
To gain insight into those perspectives, after selecting cases in a particular area
18. United States v. Cintolo, 818 F.2d 980 (1st Cir. 1987).
19. International Telemeter Corp. v. Teleprompter Corp., 592 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1979).
20. Maxwell v. Superior Court of Los Angeles, 30 Cal. 3d 606 (1982) (holding that the defendant's
constitutional right to counsel gave him the right to transfer the rights to his story to a lawyer in
exchange for legal representation as long as the transfer is knowing, voluntary, and made after full
disclosure by counsel of the risks and benefits of such a deal); see also MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcT Rule 1.8 (d) (1994) (prohibiting such contracts); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-104(B) (1983) (same).

Page 117: Summer/Autumn 1995]

THE SIGNS

of law, we invited participation of professors in that area, practitioners, business
people, school administrators, and others who might reflect the client's
perspective. We brought these people together to discuss the selected cases.
We recorded those sessions and used the transcripts to write teaching notes that
included the host-professor's perspective, the practitioner and client's perspective, along with information provided by us on the ethics rules and the law
governing lawyers that would help the teacher feel comfortable discussing those
matters. We included a guest ethics professor or two at most of our sessions,
so that the teaching notes on ethics reflected more than just our particular take
on the subject.
We believe we have produced some rich teaching notes through this process
to accompany cases that allow the integrated teaching of ethics and substantive
law. Moreover, we have had some luck getting others to use these materials.
Most of these materials are in use at Boston University; some have been tried
at Michigan, others at the University of Virginia. We have shared our materials
with Professor Deborah Rhode at Stanford, who has authored a book on the
pervasive method, and with Professor Roger Cramton at Cornell, who is
working with his colleagues there on improving the pervasive method of
teaching ethics. Professor Randy Barnett has included our contract cases,
related ethics rules, and questions raising the ethical issues in these cases in his
new contracts textbook." To assist the contracts professor with this material,
he has also included our teaching notes in his teacher's manual.
However, all in all, we remain somewhat disappointed. Professors are not
rushing to adopt these materials. We believe that part of that is due to sheer
laziness or inertia; getting professors to do something new in class is no mean
feat. For that reason, we believe that persuading other textbook authors to do
what Professor Barnett has done would be the best way of persuading professors
to try the material. Teaching what is already in the book requires less energy
than adding new material.
While we hope that the textbook-inclusion strategy will work, we also
believe that something more systemic stands in the way of all of us who take
ethics seriously: The rest of legal academia does not. That brings us back to the
question with which we began. What has the money and our efforts accomplished, and what remains to be done?
III
THE FUTURE

Law and economics, as a discipline, has flourished in recent years, and the
John M. Olin Foundation's money has played an important role in that success
story. Of course, economics has some natural advantages that ethics does not
have: In modem academia, economics enjoys a prominence and an aura of rigor

21.

RANDY BARNETr, CONTRACTS CASES AND DOCTRINE (1995).
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that ethics does not share. But the money helped. The Olin Foundation funded
research, not teaching. The scholarship multiplied, and some of it was quite
good. Law and economics prospered as a discipline. More courses were
offered. Professors in other subjects started doing "it." Again, we do not mean
to suggest that the money caused all this, but it did play a part. Professors are
more prone to teach things that connect with their scholarly interests. And
respect in academia is associated not with successful teaching but with acclaimed
scholarship. Indeed, one way to risk loss of academic standing is to devote too
much time to exploring new teaching methods. Ironically, to the extent that law
school deans, law school donors, and others within and without the law school
community continue to encourage the relatively few ethics scholars to devote
their energies to non-scholarly pursuits-like the development of innovative
teaching materials-they contribute to perpetuating the low status of the subject
that they intend to honor.
We believe in good teaching. We are committed to striving to improve our
own teaching and to helping improve the quality of ethics teaching generally.
We spent five years writing a textbook to improve the basic ethics course, and
nearly as much time developing the pervasive ethics materials that we have just
discussed. We are proud of the work we did with the help and encouragement
of the Keck Foundation. But, in our opinion, too little grant money and too
little law school attention has been given to supporting scholarship in ethics: to
creating and funding chairs, to creating and supporting journals, to providing
research grants. One ignores a community's culture at the risk of being
ineffectual. To elevate legal ethics to the status it deserves, one needs to
embrace the signs of seriousness and rigor that are recognized in the law school
culture, at least to the extent that those signs are consistent with the mission
itself. We have practiced what we preach: Our textbook appropriates the signs
of rigor and our pervasive materials do as well. And, if we may be forgiven for
an immodesty that is born of dedication and concern, we encourage others to
follow suit. To focus on the production and promotion of quality scholarship
is consistent with the goal of improving teaching in ethics and the goal of
demanding respect and attention for the subject in the larger law school
community. Scholarship is the coin in this realm.
We believe that an investment in such research can have returns that reach
far beyond legal ethics as a discipline or its parent subject, ethics. Quality
scholarship in legal ethics has the potential to exert a positive influence on legal
scholarship as a whole because, at its best, scholarship in legal ethics offers two
attributes sorely lacking in contemporary legal scholarship: attention to context
and a focus on obligation.
The subject of "practical ethics" is above all contextual. By contextual, we
mean that practical ethics addresses specific persons situated in specific settings
having to make decisions in real time (of which there is always a shortage) with
imperfect information, with real and often irreversible consequences. Law as
a larger human institution is similarly contextual-that is, specific in historical
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time and in place of application-for essentially similar reasons. Despite these
characteristics of law and the practice of law (including the judicial function),
the ethos of legal scholarship over the last two decades has been to celebrate
the abstract, expressing contempt for the contextual characteristics that make
law law as opposed to philosophy or utopian vision. The quest has been for
escape from the specific into the general, the universal, and the eternal. Theory
in law and economics, for example, is of this character, as is the "equality"
theorizing of scholars who generally have different political commitments from
their law and economic counterparts. Writing about law-a contextual
enterprise-at the levels of abstraction cherished by much of legal academia, in
our opinion sheds precious little light on the subject that is supposedly the
object of legal scholarship-the law. In contrast, some illuminating work in law
and economics and other "law and -" disciplines is based in factual foundations, whether statistical or case studies. But that work is too often marginalized. Legal ethics is similarly based, and similarly marginalized. Major support
for research in legal ethics may help counteract that trend.
Legal ethics, however, offers something more than a concentration on
context. It focuses on a body of "obligations" rather than "rights." For at least
the last four decades, legal analysis has been preoccupied with rights, particularly individual rights. We share the view that rights are important. But so are
obligations, which are generally correlative of rights. Lawyers are specially
burdened with obligations precisely because they enjoy special rights and
powers, notably the right to bring and defend lawsuits and the right to give
advice and assistance under the cloak of confidentiality. The study of legal
ethics is, to a large extent, the study of obligations designed to constrain the
exercise of those special legal rights and powers. It is therefore a model for
parallel study of obligation in other legal subject matter, for example, that of
parties to contractual relationships, of corporate officials and public officials, and
of fiduciaries generally.
To say, as we have, that obligations are generally correlative of rights is not
to say that emphasizing one yields the same result as emphasizing the other.
Which concept is emphasized is of critical importance. Modern jurisprudential
thought begins with rights as its central and most celebrated legal category: It
is rights that dignify and ennoble. Privilege and status is defined in terms of
rights: He who has the most rights is seen as the most privileged member of the
community. Rights are to be pursued, revered, preserved. In this jurisprudential vision, legal obligations are burdens, the antithesis of rights, things to be
avoided when possible and minimized at all other times. Ethics presents a
counterpoint to this vision. Ethics begins with obligation as the central
category. In ethics, it is obligation that carries the power to dignify and
ennoble. Obligations are opportunities, not burdens; they are opportunities to
fulfill responsibilities and thus show oneself worthy to be considered an honored
member of some community. Our law does manage to dole out responsibilities-taxes, tort law, and the like-but only in legal and judicial ethics does it
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manage to encode the idea of obligation as opportunity, as a dignifying and
ennobling responsibility. Without strong correlative obligations, rights are weak
and vulnerable. With its understanding of obligation as blessing, not burden,
legal ethics has much to contribute to "rights theory" and modern jurisprudential thought.22

IV
CONCLUSION

After all the money and all our efforts, some good has been accomplished;
much, however, remains to be done. Legal ethics has too long ignored the law,
its importance to the subject of legal ethics, its traditional methods of educating
students, and the signs it uses to denote what is serious. Law and law schools
have also too long ignored ethics, in part as a consequence of the distance ethics
has kept from law. If each camp moves toward one another, there is much to
be gained: respect for the critical subject of ethics and renewed relevance for the
scholarly project of law. To understand how important it is for each side to
move closer to the other, one need only pay attention to the signs.

22. For an elaboration of these thoughts, see Susan P. Koniak, Through the Looking Glass
of Ethics and the Wrong with Rights We Find There, 9 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 1 (1995).

